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Drug Companies and Schizophrenia: Unbridled Capitalism Meets
Madness
By Loren R. Mosher, Richard Gosden and Sharon Beder
I.

Introduction:
While the major thrust of this volume is an examination of the psychosocial origins

and approaches to dealing with the problem labeled as “schizophrenia” it must also
provide a historical context and examine critically how the current complete domination
of schizophrenia’s “treatment” by the neuroleptic drugs (we’ll use this term and antipsychotic interchangeably) came to be. Not only do they dictate practice but they also
buttress the biomedical theorizing that dominates thinking about the problem.

Chlorpromazine (“Thorazine”), the first neuroleptic, arrived on the psychiatric
scene in the early 1950’s. It received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval in
1955. By 1958 it was in almost universal use in American mental hospitals for the
treatment of “schizophrenia” and “related conditions”. Such rapid adoption of a new
treatment was previously unheard of in psychiatry. How did this occur? In 1956 Smith
Klein and French (“SKF”), Thorazine’s manufacturer, assembled its American drug
“detailers”(salesperson’s) to instruct them to behave as “assault troops”(Johnson, 1990)
in their efforts to convince psychiatrists to use their new “magic bullet”. This represents
the first massive public relations foray by a pharmaceutical company into a previously
small market-institutional psychiatry. In its first year on the market the drug made $75
million for SKF (Healy, 2002a). The rest, as they say, is history-Thorazine and it
successors, despite their adverse effects, are widely viewed as the only “real” treatment
for “schizophrenia”. The basic elements of this aggressive sales campaign, refined and
expanded (detailed below), would be used time and again sell new drugs to the
psychiatric market. The introduction of chlorpromazine was such a defining moment in
American Psychiatry that it has, over the years, generated a number of unsupportable
beliefs about what these drugs actually did.
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While these are so firmly held they may warrant an attribution of being “delusions”
Mosher and Burti (1994) have charitably divided the beliefs into “known” and
“mythological”. The tables below are modified from page 52 of their 1994 volume.

Table 1
Neuroleptic Drugs: Proven Effects
1. Reduce the “positive”(externally expressed) symptoms of “schizophrenia”
2. Shorten, overall, hospital stays
3. Usually reduce readmission rates
4. Produce serious, often permanent, iatrogenic diseases like tardive dyskinesia
5. Revitalized interest in “schizophrenia”
6. Produce enormous corporate profits
Table 2
Neuroleptic Drugs: Mythological Effects
1. Responsible for depopulation of psychiatric hospitals -“deinstitutionalization”
2. Improve long-term recovery rates for “schizophrenia”
3. Enhance learning of new coping skills
4. Address the etiology of “schizophrenia”
5. Readmission rates would be nearly zero if drug compliance were assured
With this background the current context of the influence of the pharmaceutical
industry (capitalism) and psychopharmacology on psychiatry and
“schizophrenia”(madness) in particular can be examined.
II. Some Facts, Figures and Opinions:
It is abundantly clear to any thoughtful observer of the psychiatric scene that drug
company influence is pervasive and expanding. A few facts are illustrative: between 1993
and 2001 prescription drug spending tripled in the U.S. — from $50 billion to 150 billion
or more (Szegely-Marzak, 2001). For the third consecutive year (2001) prescription drug
prices rose in double digits (17%)-in contrast to overall inflation-which remained in the
2-3% range (Public Citizen, 2001). In 2000, psychotropic drug sales in the U.S totaled
$23 billion and are expected to rise to $42 billion by 2005. Of the $23 billion, over $10
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billion was spent on anti-depressants.

Between 1990 and 2000 spending on anti-

depressant drugs rose 800% (Tanouy, 2001), due principally to the introduction of the
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRI’s”).

Over the same period, the

availability of the new “atypical” anti-psychotic drugs caused spending on neuroleptics to
rise 600 percent, to 4 billion dollars in 2001 (Moukheiber, 2001). The successful selling
of “atypical” anti-psychotics-the reason for this 600% rise- to replace the older, no longer
patented neuroleptics- will be the major focus of this chapter. One indication of the
success of the selling of the “atypicals” is the increase in use of antipsychotic drugs in
youth (under 18) in the last decade: 50,000 outpatients received them in 1992; by 2002
the figure had reached 530,000 (Thomas, 2002)!

The large pharmaceutical companies averaged between 30-40% of revenues spent on
marketing and administration, 15-20% profit and 12-15% on research and development.
In the U.S they paid an average of 16% of revenues in taxes whereas all other industries
averaged 27% (Angell and Relman, 2001). They have 625 paid lobbyists in Washington,
D.C.-one per congressperson (Public Citizen, 2001)! They spent nearly $5 billion on
direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) (TV and non-medical magazine) advertising in 2001. Until
1997, DTC advertising had been forbidden-and still is in the rest of the Western
Industrialized World.

Roughly a third of the American Psychiatric Association’s

(“APA”) budget is derived from various drug sources (Psychiatric News 15/8/97, p. 4).
APA meetings are dominated by drug company sponsored exhibits and symposia that
provide attendees with a variety of enticements — music, food, drink, disc players etc.
Drug companies provide substantial support to nearly all of the mental health
advocacy organizations like the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (“NAMI”), the
National Mental Health Association (“NMHA”), the National Alliance for Research on
Schizophrenia and Affective Disorders (“NARSAD”), National Depressive Disorder
Screening Day, the Anxiety Disorders Association etc. (O’Harrow, 2000). The only
groups Big Pharma doesn’t support are the true consumer advocacy organizations like the
Support Coalition International (SCI), the National Empowerment Center (NEC), the
National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy (NARPA).
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Perhaps the industry’s most successful marketing tool is direct personal contact
with doctors by their “detailers”, recently reframed as “sales representatives”. These
representatives are portrayed as “conduits of information”. Actually, they supply well
sanitized information (adverse effects are either not part of their training, not discussed or
muted by being placed in the very fine print), promotional materials and samples of their
company’s latest products. In 2001 there were, industry wide, 83,000 such persons —
twice the 1996 number. These “conduits of information” cost about $8 billion a year and
their samples an equivalent amount (Angell and Relman, 2001).
The drug industry supports clinical trial research at universities to the extent that it
is doubtful that many departments of psychiatry could survive without it (Angell, 2000).
The pharmaceutical industry owns the data from clinical trials it supports, decides which
studies will be published, chooses authors, ghost writes articles and revises them to
present the best possible interpretation of the data (NEJM Editorial, 2001). The
pervasiveness of ghost writing has recently been highlighted. In a lecture at the
Maudsley Hospital Dr. David Healy remarked:
“Ghost writing has been present for 50 years but it has recently extended from puff pieces
to symposium supplement articles right into the mainstream of medical literature. At
present, data indicate that more than 50% of the authors on pharmacotherapy literature
participate in articles that either originate in communications agencies, have company
authors in the authorship line, or have otherwise been closely vetted by pharmaceutical
companies (Healy, 2002b).”
John le Carre, In Place of Nations, an essay appearing in The Nation of April 9, 2001
(page 11) said the following about the pharmaceutical industry from the perspective of a
non-scientist:
“BIG PHARMA (the multinational pharmaceutical world), as it is known, offered
everything: the hopes and dreams we have of it; its vast, partly realized potential for
good; and it’s pitch-dark underside, sustained by huge wealth, pathological secrecy,
corruption and greed.”
“And of all these crimes of unbridled capitalism, it seemed to me, as I began to cast
round for a story to illustrate this argument in my most recent novel, that the
pharmaceutical industry offered me the most eloquent example.”
“Do I hear you offering the drug companies’ time-worn excuse that they need to make
huge profits on one drug in order to finance the research and development of others?
Then kindly tell me, please, how come they spend more than twice as much on marketing
as they do on research and development?”
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“But Big Pharma is also engaged in the deliberate seduction of the medical profession,
country by country, worldwide. It is spending a fortune on influencing, hiring and
purchasing academic judgment to a point where, in a few years’ time, if Big Pharma
continues unchecked on its present happy path, unbought medical opinion will be hard to
find.”
“And consider what happens to supposedly impartial academic medical research when
giant pharmaceutical companies donate whole biotech buildings and endow
professorships at universities and teaching hospitals where their products are tested and
developed. There has been a steady flow of alarming cases in recent years where
inconvenient scientific finding have been suppressed or rewritten, and those responsible
for them hounded off their campuses with their professional and personal reputations
systematically trashed by the machinations of public relations agencies in the pay of the
pharmas.”
In “Is Academic Medicine for Sale?” New England Journal of Medicine (
5/18/2000) editor Marcia Angell catalogued from her professional point of view the many
ways that drug money flowed to academic doctors:
“The ties between clinical researchers and industry include not only grant support, but
also a host of other financial arrangements. Researchers also serve as consultants to
companies whose products they are studying, join advisory boards and speakers’ bureaus,
enter into patent and royalty arrangements, agree to be the listed authors of articles
ghostwritten by interested companies, promote drugs and devices at company sponsored
symposiums and allow themselves to be plied with expensive gifts and trips to luxurious
settings. Many also have equity interest in the companies.”
Psychiatrists Joanna Moncrieff and Phil Thomas wrote (March 2002) to the British
Medical Journal:
“The influence of the pharmaceutical industry is particularly pernicious in
psychiatry where the possibilities for colonizing ever more aspects of human
life are potentially limitless. Psychiatry is an area of controversy, where
different paradigms and approaches to treatment are hotly contested. The
financial muscle of the pharmaceutical industry has helped to tip the scales
in favour of a predominantly biological view of psychiatric disorder. This
has submerged alternative therapeutic approaches, despite the fact that
user-led research indicates that service users find a wide variety of
non-medical approaches valuable in coping with emotional distress”.
III.

A Primer for Understanding “Big Pharma’s” Market Tactics
The strategies, tactics and techniques used by the industry to market its products

are legion. We will present them in outline form to give readers a basic understanding.
1. The approval process:
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The American process will be described but it is roughly similar in all western
European countries. For a new drug two studies must be submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) that indicate the drug is better than placebo and is without
serious adverse effects for condition “X”. What is not well known is that the drug’s
manufacturer can conduct as many studies as necessary until the required two are found.
The drug need not be more effective than ones already available for condition “X”. Data
from “failed studies”-those showing no significant drug placebo differences- are not
supplied to the FDA. If approved, the drug can be marketed for condition “X”. The
companies can later apply, by submitting new studies or new analyses from old studies
for the drug’s indications to be extended to other conditions or new populations (e.g.,
youth, the elderly). This opens a new market. The “new indications” technique has
proved to be a highly successful with the SSRI’s: first approved only for depression but
now approved for obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), post traumatic stress disorder,
and various anxiety disorders. With each new approval a massive sales campaign is
mounted to assure its immediate adoption in practice. A recent article in Mother Jones
(Aug. 2002) “Disorders, Made to Order” by Brendan Koerner details what happened in
the spring of 2001 when the FDA approved paroxitine (“Paxil”) for the treatment of
“generalized anxiety disorder (“GAD”) the disorder made to order for the drug.
Of great importance is the fact that once a drug is on the market an individual
doctor can legally prescribe it for “off label”(unapproved) indications-perhaps suggested
by drug company “friendly” peers at evening dinner events or sometimes (illegally) by
visiting sales representatives. Because doctors are often given a variety of drug company
“perks”, beginning while still in training, they are “open” to listening to the detailers and
may in fact be rewarded with more goodies if they prescribe enough (the companies track
prescribing practices) of a new “silver bullet”(Wazana, 2000).
2. Sales campaigns:
•

“Carpet Bombing” of doctor’s offices with visits from sales representatives who
distribute promotional materials and samples.

•

Sponsorship of nationwide symposia keynoted by “thought leaders” in the field who
are on the company’s payroll. This includes organizing “educational” forums for
government, academia, and the public.
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•

Publication of selected (most positive) studies of the drug authored by high profile
investigators to lend them extra credibility. Up to 50% of these may be “ghost
authored”.

•

Endorsements by various organizations with paid alliances with the drug companyNAMI, NMHA etc. A remarkable example of this type of activity is that of the
Global Alliance Mental Illness Advocacy Network (“GAMIAN”). It was started
based on the results of a 1998 survey, funded mostly by Bristol Meters, showing that
most people didn t like taking psychiatric drugs, primarily because of their adverse
effects. There was therefore a “need” to undertake a “worldwide” campaign to
“encourage” more people to seek psychiatric treatment. Like other organizations it
promotes Big Pharma’s agenda.

•

Generation of a “media hype” via celebrity endorsements, articles placed by public
relations agencies and direct to consumer advertising. The latter is a relatively new
technique (1997) that has proven highly successful.

•

Expanding the prescriber base: The company will focus its detailers efforts on getting
primary care doctors comfortable with prescribing their new “safe, effective and well
tolerated” drug that has ordinarily been the province of a particular specialty group.
This has been an extraordinarily successful technique with both the SSRI antidepressants (i.e. 60% or more of SSRI prescriptions are written by non-psychiatrists)
and the “atypical” anti-psychotic drugs. An interesting new tactic has emerged for
expanding the prescriber base: it is alleged that the drug companies are supporting
legislative efforts to give psychologists prescribing privileges. If true, and successful,
the relationship between psychiatry and the industry will be worth watching!

•

Large market formulary makers are lobbied to convince them the drug should be
included in the formularies so it will be paid for by programs like the relevant
National Health Care agency or Medicaid, managed care companies, insurers and the
military in the U.S.

•

Substantial political campaign contributions are made, and legislators and
government regulatory bodies are lobbied to be sure pharmaceutical company
interests are protected and advanced.
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•

Persons less suspect than drug corporation executives (prominent academicians and
scientists) are paid to represent them in taking the lead to counter criticisms. If this
fails, critics are systematically discredited, demonized or harassed by colleagues
employed in some capacity by the company. Not so subtle innuendoes about the
critic’s mental health or some putative personal foible are commonly used in the
demonization process.

•

Funding will be withdrawn from Journals or other outlets that publish material
unfavorable to the pharmaceutical company’s interests. Investigators have even been
sued by the company that paid for the research when negative results were published!

•

If sued because of a drug’s adverse effect(s) companies prefer to settle out of court
and “seal” the case to avoid harmful publicity and to insure the parties can’t reveal
the details of the settlement.

•

As patents begin to run out the companies engage in a number of strategies to keep
generic versions of the drug off the market. They buy off the potential generic drug
makers, tie them up in long court proceedings, produce a new form of the drug (e.g.
long acting) and
threaten groups working to enhance the availability of generic drugs.

For example, on September 4, 2002 the NY Times published a report by Peterson and
Abelson titled “Companies Reduce Roles in Lobby Group for Generics”. In summary, it
reported that
two members of a lobbying coalition for generic drugs (“Business for Affordable
Medicine”) had left the group or reduced their roles after big drug makers, Eli Lilly and
Wyeth, threatened to end contracts with Georgia Pacific Paper and Verizon
Communications, who had been supporting this lobbying effort.
Most simply put Big Pharma knows, and maximizes the usefulness of, the fact that
“for a gift, one is always beholden.” They are also well versed in the suppression of
dissent and the use of corporate power.
IV. Conflict of Interest-Is the fox watching the chicken coop?

8

A special problem is that it has become nearly impossible for the American drug
regulatory agency, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to convene advisory
groups that do not contain members with conflicts of interest in the discussion of drugs
under consideration. The September 25, 2000 issue of USA Today analyzed the financial
conflicts at 159 FDA advisory committee meetings from January 1, 1998 through
June 30, 2000. They found that at 92% of the meetings, at least one member had a
financial conflict of interest. At 55% of the meetings, half or more of the FDA advisors
had conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest were most frequent at the 57 meetings
when broader issues were discussed; 92% of members had conflicts. At the 102 meetings
dealing with the fate of a specific drug, 33% of the experts had a financial conflict. In
addition about half of the FDA’s budget is derived from drug company fees. Is the fox
watching the chicken coop?
V. A Current Example: Selling the Atypical Anti-Psychotic Drugs
1. Good Drug / Bad DrugAlthough the drug companies made handsome profits early on from their
neuroleptic drugs their sales of this class of drugs stopped growing when the indications
for their use were fairly clearly confined to psychosis because of their dangers. Also, the
increasing number of “me-to” anti-psychotic (17 by 1980) drugs split the profit pie into
many modest size pieces. Finally, by the mid-1980’s nearly all of these agents had run
out their patent lives and cheaper generic versions had become available. This meant that
spending on these agents was basically flat, at about 400 million dollars a year, from
1980 until the approval of clozapine in 1990-the first of the so- called “atypical antipsychotic” drugs to be used in the USA. However, it was not until risperidone’s
(“Risperdal”) approval in 1994 that this new class of drugs became a realistic option to
the older ones. Clozapine is a complicated and dangerous drug to administer with limited
indications-hence it was approached with caution. Three additional atypical agents were
not far behind risperidone (olazapine-“Zyprexa”, quietapine-“Seroquel”, and ziprasidone-
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“Geodon”) in the FDA approval process. So, the task of Big Pharma was to have its new,
patented, far more expensive drugs replace the older ones. With four to chose from they
had to be concerned both about market share and market penetration.
Not unexpectedly, the older drugs-made by the very same pharmaceutical
companies-were suddenly not very good-especially when compared with the new ones.
It was as if the deficiences and toxicity’s of the older agents (e.g. chlorpromazine,
haloperidol, fluphenazine etc.) had been suddenly discovered. They were ineffective in
30-40% of cases, had very high rates of unpleasant side effects and caused, over the
longer term, the now terrible iatrogenic diseases of tardive dyskinesia, tardive dementia
and neuroleptic induced deficiency syndrome (NIDS) (Healy, 2002a). Before the pricey
new patented drugs arrived these problems were never sufficient to warrant questioning
their use. Suddenly they became intolerable. All stops were pulled out as Big Pharma
used its tried and true PR methods-perfected with the selling of the SSRI’s to replace the
older tricyclic anti-depressants.
However, in introducing the new drugs the pharmaceutical companies were
confronted by two difficult public relations problems: (a) the new drugs are many times
more expensive than the older drugs and, (b) according to critics, they are not any more
effective or safer than the old drugs they replace. (Breggin and Cohen, 1999, pp. 76-82,
the FDA and Geddes et. al. 2000). In its final letter of approval to Janssen, the FDA made
explicit its conclusions about the relative merits of risperidone and haloperidol. Robert
Temple, director of the FDA’s Office of Drug Evaluation, told Janssen:
“We would consider any advertisement or promotion labeling for RISPERDAL false,
misleading, or lacking fair balance under section 502 (a) and 502 (n) of the ACT if there
is presentation of data that conveys the impression that risperidone is superior to
haloperidol or any other marketed antipsychotic drug product with regard to safety or
effectiveness.”(Whitaker, 2001, p. 277).”
Geddes et. al. (2000) reviewed results from fifty-two studies, involving 12,649
patients, and concluded, “there is no clear evidence that atypical antipsychotics are more
effective or are better tolerated than conventional antipsychotics.”
2. Setting the Agenda:
The pharmaceutical companies wanted to maximize their profits in what appeared
to be a potentially critical environment and a tight market. They decided the best

10

approach would be to find ways to expand the size of the market. Hitherto the market for
schizophrenia drugs had been restricted by diagnostic conventions, on the one hand, and
civil liberties protections on the other. Until recently diagnostic conventions generally
limited the recognition of schizophrenia, and therefore the application of neuroleptic drug
treatment, to persons with active clinical symptoms indicative of psychosis. The drug
company agenda setters determined to expand the market by breaking this convention
and promoting the concept of an additional pre-psychotic phase of schizophrenia that
requires preventive treatment with their new drugs. To further expand the market they
also participated in campaigns to weaken civil liberties protections and thereby increase
the number of people who could be treated involuntarily. Finally, as they did to promote
the SSRI’s, they expanded the prescriber base to primary care physicians, gerontologists
and pediatricians. This was accomplished by sending sales representatives to these
physician’s offices to promote the “safety, effectiveness and well tolerated” mantra-this
time about the atypical anti-psychotics as compared with the “problematic” older
neuroleptics. So, the impression was left that these newer agents would be safe to use in
youth, non-psychotic persons and the elderly. The previously noted (p. x) ten-fold
increase in use of antipsychotic drugs in the 18 and under population in the last decade is
stark testimony to the success of this effort.
The overall solution was the development of a two-fold public relations campaign
that is still in progress. The first part involves harnessing support groups for relatives of
people suffering from schizophrenia as the driving force for an advocacy coalition (see
NAMI’s contribution to the media hype below). This has been achieved by carefully
focussed funding of these organizations. (Gosden, 2001, pp. 94-97). Once they were
made dependent on drug company ‘sponsorship’ they could then be used as public
relations front-groups to assist with planting stories in the media about the efficacy and
safety of the new drugs and about claims that schizophrenia has supposedly been
scientifically proven to be a brain disease requiring urgent drug treatment at the earliest
signs. A ready example of this practice can found at Schizophrenia.com
(Schizophrenia.com, 2001a) which purports to be “A Not-for-Profit Information, Support
and Education Center” representing consumers. However, Schizophrenia.com
acknowledges on its web site that it is funded by Janssen Pharmaceuticals.
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(Schizophrenia.com, 2001b). The slant on schizophrenia being promoted by drug
company-funded organisations like Schizophrenia.com is intended to impact on
governments as expressions of public interest advocacy and to position the new drugs as
preferred methods of treatment by government mental health services.
3. Media Hype
Another part of their strategy involved a media hype by “experts”. Some examples
follow:
This new drug (risperidone), the Washington Post reported (2/16/93) “represents a
glimmer of hope for a disease that until recently had been considered hopeless.” George
Simpson, a prominent psychopharmacologist (and long term drug company “consultant”
“adviser” “investigator”) at the Medical College of Pennsylvania, told the Post “The data
is very convincing. It is a new hope, and at this moment it appears, like clozapine, to be
different from all existing drugs.” The New York Times (1/15/92) quoting Richard
Meibach, Janssen’s clinical research director (no conflict of interest here for sure),
reported that “no major side effects” had appeared in any of the 2,000 - plus patients who
had been in the clinical trials.
Olanzapine, the Wall Street Journal (10/04/96) announced has “substantial advantages”
over other current therapies. “Zyprexa is a wonderful drug for psychotic patients,” said
John Zajecka, at Rush Medical College in Chicago. Stanford University Psychiatrist Alan
Schatzberg, meanwhile confessed to the New York Times (4/14/98) “It’s a potential
breakthrough of tremendous magnitude.”(Whitaker, 2001, p.260-61). Endorsements for
specific drugs like these, from academic psychiatrists, usually indicate drug company
sponsorship.
Parade Magazine (11/21/99) told its readers, “far safer and more effective in treating
negative symptoms, such as difficulty in reasoning and speaking in an organized way.”
The Chicago Tribune (6/4/99) echoed the sentiment: The newer drugs “ are safer and
more effective than older ones. They help people go to work.”
Or as the Los Angeles Times (1/30/98) put it: “It used to be that schizophrenics were
given no hope of improving. But now, thanks to new drugs and commitment, they’re
moving back into society like never before.”(Whitaker, 2001, p. 259)
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Laurie Flynn, then Executive Director of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
(“NAMI”), put an exclamation point on it all: “These new drugs truly are a breakthrough.
They mean we should finally be able to keep people out of the hospital, and it means that
the long-term disability of schizophrenia can come to an end.”
‘
Money, glowing press – this was a good new story all around, and finally the NAMI put
it together into its full mythic glory. In 1999, it copyrighted “Breakthroughs in
Antipsychotic Medications”, by Weiden et. al. Inside the front cover were framed, color
photos of the new wonder pills. The NAMI authors wrote: “Conventional antipsychotics
all do about the same job in the brain. They all correct brain chemistry by working on the
dopamine systems in the brain…the newer medications seem to do a better job of
balancing all of the brain chemicals, including dopamine and serotonin…just give the
new medication plenty of time to a good job!” (Weiden et al, 1999)(from Whitaker, 2001,
p. 283). This glowing set of endorsements should be contrasted with the views of the
FDA, Breggin and Cohen and Geddes et. al noted above.

4. A Question of Ethics
An aspect of the campaign involves funding selected psychiatric researchers to
promote the doubtful belief that schizophrenia must be detected and treated in a prepsychotic stage to avoid brain deterioration. (Gosden, 2001, pp. 224-247). This line of
argument has the potential to vastly expand the market for schizophrenia drugs and has
already led to the development in Australia of government-sponsored preventive
treatment programs for schizophrenia, that utilize the new drugs. Treating “at risk”
adolescents with these very powerful agents raises serious ethical issues that the drug
companies and their researchers’ fail to attend to in any meaningful way. The risk of
serious adverse effects, treating large numbers of “false positive” youth with these
powerful drugs, the potential for stigmatization and the creation of a self –fulfilling
prophecies are given scant consideration in this “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead”
endeavor. A project studying “pre-psychotic at risk” youth at Yale University has
already been criticized for its failure to provide an accurate informed consent document.
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Mysteriously, it did not mention the possible consequences of treatment with olanzapine!
Most recently, the Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital in London has
approved a controversial protocol to treat “at risk” youngsters with an atypical psychotic
drug (the Guardian, Aug. 25, 2002).
5. Let the Force Be With You:
A key element of the PR strategy involves funding from the drug company Eli
Lilly being channeled through both the World Psychiatric Association (Rosen et al. 2000)
and NAMI (Silverstein, 1999; Oaks, 2000, p. 14) to mount an anti-stigma campaign. The
thrust of the anti-stigma campaign is to advocate for the elimination of discrimination
against people diagnosed with schizophrenia, so long as they are taking medication- by
force if necessary.
Meanwhile, in what appears to be a coordinated strategy, the Treatment Advocacy Center
(TAC), which was originally established as branch of NAMI, has been feeding a very
different, but complimentary, line to the media and the public about the dangerousness of
untreated schizophrenia. This line involves associating untreated schizophrenia with
news stories about violent behavior (Torrey & Zdanowicz, 1999, p. 27A) and promoting
wild hyperbole about the murderous intentions of untreated schizophrenics: “Violent
episodes by individuals with untreated schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have risen
dramatically, now accounting for an estimated 1,000 homicides annually in the United
States” (Treatment Advocacy Center, 2001a). This approach is intended to send an
agenda setting spin in the opposite direction by scaring the public and impacting on
governments as a law and order imperative. The policy intention with this counter spin is
to weaken civil liberties protections in mental health laws in order to increase the number
of people eligible for involuntary treatment.
Involuntary treatment is an essential part of the market for schizophrenia drugs.
Without involuntary treatment there would be a smaller market because many people
diagnosed with schizophrenia initially have to be force-treated with neuroleptic drugs. A
central objective of this hyper-stigmatizing, law and order part of the campaign is the
introduction of community treatment orders, or outpatients’ commitment. Outpatients’
commitment involves a court order that allows the forced treatment of people living in
their own homes. Until the introduction of outpatients’ commitment people could only be
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force-treated if they were in-patients in hospitals. This limited the number of involuntary
patients at any one time to the number of beds available. However, considering the
doubtful nature of diagnostic methods used for identifying schizophrenia, outpatient
commitment promises to provide an open-ended expansion of the market for the new
schizophrenia drugs. Outpatients’ commitment is already well established in most states
of Australia and is being progressively introduced, state by state, in the United States.
As an offshoot of NAMI, the Treatment Advocacy Center is dedicated to playing
its complimentary role of associating schizophrenia with violence and the urgent need for
forced treatment, which they euphemistically call “assisted treatment”.
“Assisted treatment (also known as involuntary outpatient commitment,
substituted judgement, or guardianship) must be provided before individuals
become a danger to themselves or others, particularly for individuals who lack
awareness of their illness-a common side-effect of these devastating disorders.
Current federal and state policies hinder treatment for psychiatrically ill
individuals. The Center is working on the national, state, and local levels to
educate civic, legal, criminal justice and legislative communities on the benefits of
assisted treatment legislation.
The Treatment Advocacy Center serves as a catalyst to achieve proper balance in
judicial, legislative and policy decisions that affect the lives of individuals with
serious brain disorders, such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness.”
(Treatment Advocacy Center, 2001b).

6. By the Numbers
In the middle 1990s, as a number of the new schizophrenia drugs were passing
through their final stages of approval, and these public relations campaigns were gaining
momentum, one analyst of the pharmaceutical market argued that the $1 billion a year
US market for schizophrenia drugs could be expanded to $4.5 billion a year. Annual sales
of Eli Lilly’s drug Zyprexa alone were projected “at $1 billion after five years on the
market”. But the analyst argued that the market expansion depended on the removal of
two barriers. The first barrier was that currently only half of the 2.5 million Americans
with schizophrenic symptoms were then receiving treatment. The implication was that
ways would have to be found to ensure treatment reached this other half of the
schizophrenic population. The second barrier was that a cheap generic drug was then
dominating the market. (Reuters Information Service, 1996).
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As things have turned out this analyst under-estimated of the potential for a PRdriven expansion of the market for schizophrenia drugs. A Wall Street Journal report in
May 2001 describes the market for schizophrenia drugs as a “fast-growing, $5 billion-ayear market” in which Eli Lilly’s Zyprexa has already gained a $2.35 billion share and is
“on course to surpass $2.5 billion this year”(Hensley and Burton, 2001). Using a sales
figure of 4 billion dollars for “atypical” anti-psychotic drugs in the USA in 2001 the
profit realized by Big Pharma is about 740 million dollars! In addition, the atypicals had
achieved a market penetration of nearly 90% in the US. In Europe, probably because of
national health care systems, their penetration has been around 40%(personal
communication, Nina Schooler, Ph.D. April, 2002). So, Big Pharma succeeded in every
respect-high profitability and full market penetration for the “atypicals.” Their patents
likely will have expired before we really know their serious adverse effects. They only
become apparent over the long term. Meanwhile they will be denied, in so far as
possible, by Big Pharma.
VI Policy Implications
Analysts of public policy often dissect the strategies and techniques of vested
interests like Big Pharma by using agenda setting theory. Cobb et al (1976) propose three
models of agenda building; an outside-initiative model where citizens groups gain broad
public support and get an issue onto the formal agenda; a second model where the issues
are initiatives that come from government and may need to be placed on the public
agenda for successful implementation; and an inside-access model where the policy
proposals come from policy communities with easy access to government, usually with
support from particular interest groups, but little public involvement.
It is clear that the types of campaigns that have been run by public relations
consultants to set the mental health agenda for the pharmaceutical industry utilize all
three of these models. They run coordinated campaigns that involve funding consumer
advocacy groups to simulate outside-initiatives; they plant stories in the media that are
designed to gain public acceptance of policies that are already on the government agenda;
and they use the insider-access model when they utilize pharmaceutical industry lobbying
organizations to gain easy access to government. This access is facilitated by the millions
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of dollars pharmaceuticals companies and associations donate to politicians and political
parties. (See for example, Mintz, 2000, p. A26; Public Citizen, 2000).
The use of sophisticated public relations techniques for setting political agendas
has become a standard practice in most advanced democracies. The consequences are
slowly becoming apparent. The system of representative democracy is being reshaped
into a new kind of “managed corporatocracy” in which public opinion and government
policy are custom-made products that can be shaped, packaged and sold by skilled public
relations experts. This example of a successful campaign to sell a very expensive
product-the atypical antipsychotic drugs- is chilling testimony to the power of Big
Pharma to have its way with us.
The cynical way in which this shaping, packaging and selling has been carried out
in regard to mental health policy-making over the last couple of decades should serve as a
warning to anyone who believes that the public good should come before corporate
profits. Policies tailored to this commercial purpose are not necessarily beneficial either
for patients or the society at large
The acute vulnerability of mental patients to exploitation, and the existence of
mental health laws that provide for involuntary detention and treatment of certain classes
of mentally disordered people, creates conditions that require vigilant protection of civil
liberties and human rights. To do so in the face of the power of a $ 150 billion a year
industry (in the U.S.) that has only the “bottom line” to guide its activities is a
formidable, and perhaps impossible, task without assertive governmental regulatory
intervention. Given the current American political climate it appears that such
intervention is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
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